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Hungary’s and Poland’s responses to COVID-19 demonstrate how illiberal
constitutionalism works in practice. In both countries, national constitutional or sub-
constitutional emergency regimes provide the framework for government action.
Different political and constitutional contexts, however, mean that their specific
proceedings diverge: In Hungary, in the beginning, governmental actions followed
the non-partisan constitutional procedural and technical rules. When it was, however,
not beneficial anymore, the Government simply ignored a particular constitutional
provision. In Poland, on the other hand, upcoming presidential elections and financial
considerations would turn an application of the Polish Constitution into a potential
threat to the ruling majority. Instead of observing the Constitution, the Polish
government has decided to use statutory means. These are not only inadequate
for the current stage of the crisis but also undermine the liberal 1997 Constitution,
informally creating its very own illiberal constitution.
On March 11, Hungary declared the so-called “danger of crises”. Poland followed
suit, declaring the “state of epidemic threat” on March 13 and the “state of epidemic”
on March 20. In the weeks that followed, non-food stores have closed in both
countries. Restaurants in Poland can serve only take-out, in Hungary they shut their
doors after 3pm. Cinemas are closed. Schools and universities have closed and
resorted to distance learning. Borders are closed – Hungarians and Poles can return
home from abroad, but have to undergo health checks and other precautions. In
both Poland and Hungary, there is a radical limitation on outside activities, such
as gatherings and assemblies. Limitations of everyday life have been introduced
gradually as the virus spread. While there is no curfew yet in Poland, Hungary has
introduced a partial one for 15 days on March 28. The number of infections and
fatalities continues to grow.
Both Hungary and Poland have provided an extraordinary answer to the deepening
crisis. However, they have applied different measures. The “danger of crises” is
a constitutional institution described in detail by the Hungarian Fundamental Law
(FL). Even if the content of the FL is objectionable in many ways, its regime on
emergencies might be an exception. Based on Hungary’s former Constitution,
the FL’s emergency provisions define situations, authorize, delegate, require
cooperation and continuity, set deadlines, limits, and guarantees. The Polish “state
of epidemic threat” and the “state of epidemic”, on the other hand, are regulated by
the statute on infectious diseases. Polish authorities have decided not to declare
the “state of natural disaster”, which is a constitutional means for extraordinary
situations like epidemics or pandemics. Although the Polish Constitution (hereafter:
Constitution) is not as precise as the FL in this respect, it still regulates “who”, “when”
and “for how long” the state of natural disaster can be introduced. It also contains
provisions on which human rights may be limited, proportionally to the degree of
threat, with the intention to swiftly restore conditions allowing for the State to function
normally.
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Cooperation during the crisis
The FL and the Constitution both rely on existing organs of state that should
operate during extraordinary situations. They stipulate that constitutional courts (the
Hungarian CC and the Polish CT) cannot be suspended and that the branches of
government need to cooperate. Right now, we do not know if the CC or the CT will
receive any petitions concerning the emergency measures, but courts and other
bodies can initiate procedures. Right now, the courts are on an extraordinary break
in order to avoid physical contact, but they have not completely stopped working.
The same applies to the prosecutors. We should, however, remember that both the
CC and the CT are packed.
As for the Parliaments, neither Government can suspend their operation or dissolve
them. In Hungary, the Parliament can dissolve itself but this option has not been
discussed thus far. The keynote of political communication in Hungary is that
parliamentary sessions are not „gatherings” and must continue “even during
wartime” – a rule that follows from the FL. In Poland, unlike Hungary, the Sejm
decided on March 26 to work and vote online; the Senat is also prepared to do so.
Some controversies
Transmission from the Hungarian Parliament is limited: Journalists no longer have
their permanent entry pass (they are allowed to enter on a daily basis), have to
be healthy (although it is unknown how this is checked), and are encouraged to
listen to the online transmission instead of personally attending parliamentary
sessions. In Poland, entry to the Parliament is limited as in other places; everyone’s
body temperature is measured, even MPs’; Sejm workers mainly telework, and
media staff is asked to reduce the number of entries as they can only use one
door. Transmissions are happening as usual. Polish governmental bodies send out
updates several times a day. Media participation is reduced, but meetings can take
place in person if a two meters distance is kept. In Hungary, there are daily press
conferences from the Operative Corps. Since March 19, these are broadcast instead
of taking place physically. Journalists can submit their questions beforehand; and
either receive an answer or not. In the case of anti-government media, it is usually a
“not”.
There seems to be no trust in the people in Hungary. While in Poland, information
on the spreading epidemic is sufficiently provided via the official website and
social media, the Hungarian government website on the coronavirus contains
little information. The Hungarian Operative Corps repeatedly do not answer
questions concerning the public statistical data on the geographic range of the
virus and do not give proper justification. The protection of personal data might
not be the best argument: what is requested is statistical data, and, in the case
of statutory confinement, it is not observed at all (the infected is required to put
a red document indicating the fact of the infection on their door, in a well visible
place). Hungarian and Polish officials keep saying that health workers have all the
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equipment necessary to stay safe while treating patients – contradicting reports from
health care practitioners.
In Hungary
According to the FL, the Hungarian government can issue decrees to suspend the
application of certain Acts, derogate from the provisions of Acts and take other
extraordinary measures, as provided for by a cardinal Act. These decrees are in
force for 15 days, which the Government can extend if it receives the approval of
the Parliament. In the fight against the virus, the Government has adopted many
decrees in order to enforce similar measures as have been introduced in many
countries. It had submitted an Authorisation Bill before deadlines for some decrees
affecting schools, universities, border control, court break expired. The opposition did
not support a fast-track procedure; the Bill could not be passed in time but on March
30.
The Authorization Act has received broad criticism beyond the opposition. The
Act mainly repeats and implements the FL, regarding, for example, the CC, the
possibility of governmental law-making, including the suspension of and derogation
from legislative provisions, the requirement of necessity and proportionality. Most
importantly, it extends the effect of the decrees adopted, and it agrees on their
content, which is, again, implementing the FL.
The Act also extends, ex-ante, the effect of any decrees that the Government will
adopt until the end of the crisis. This is quite disturbing because it bypasses the 15-
day deadline of the FL, authorizes something the content of which is unknown, and
effectively eliminates the possibility of oversight. While the Act does allow Parliament
to withdraw its authorization at any time, the parliamentary majority of Fidesz
makes this guarantee rather meaningless. The deadline, although constitutionally
mandated, in reality only serves as decoration. Although the measures do not expire,
the Act ensures oversight on their content: the Government regularly has to inform
either Parliament or, if it cannot hold a session, the Speaker and the leaders of the
factions. This provision is also meant as a guarantee – but there is no rule on what
happens if Parliament does not agree. While, theoretically, Parliament can withdraw
the authorization, the de facto majority of Fidesz makes this unlikely. It is how illiberal
constitutionalism works. 
The Act does not allow any by-elections and referenda, and the representative body
of the local government cannot be dissolved. This rule alone might seem as if it were
attacking democracy. However, it does so in a crisis, in which social distancing is
a rational demand, through a cardinal Act, and following the logic of the FL on the
termination of the parliamentary mandate. This restriction is also in line with the
FL’s human rights derogation provision. The Act furthermore adds two epidemic-
related crimes to the Criminal Code: violating confinement and spreading false
information. Especially the second one should make us suspicious, as it is vague
and very complex at the same time. It most probably will be of little help in fighting
the virus, will not give adequate guidance as to how it shall correctly be applied, and
might discourage critical opinions. We will see how judges will apply it.
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In the last days of March, the Government had to deal with decrees whose effects
expired and which, due to parliamentary voting, were not extended. It could have
repeatedly issued them – as many might have expected. Instead, earlier last week,
it seemed that it would choose another, less unconstitutional path: The initial plan
was, firstly, to ask the management of universities and nurseries to extend the
break, under their discretion, so that students and children can be legally kept away
from the premises. Secondly, the Minister of Interior was to issue an order on the
control of the internal Schengen borders. The Minister of Justice and the President
of the National Judicial Office would then have discussed the extraordinary break at
courts. Unfortunately, the Government preferred a purely unconstitutional path: On
March 26, the Chief Medical Officer issued a normative decision, which reissued the
content of the decrees on universities and the border. Merely based on the Act on
Legislation, this normative decision is unconstitutional as the content of no normative
decision can affect natural persons (only laws, such as Acts, decrees, etc. can have
this effect). Even in an emergency, it is only the Government that can deviate from
statutory provisions: the Chief Medical Officer has no power to do so.
In Poland
In situations of particular danger and if ordinary constitutional measures are
inadequate, the Polish Constitution allows for the introduction of the following
extraordinary measures: martial law, a state of emergency, or a state of natural
disaster. Regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, the most suitable seems to be a
state of natural disaster. The Government, however, disagrees. The Constitution
stipulates that the Government can declare a state of natural disaster in order to
prevent or tackle the consequences of a natural catastrophe or a technological
accident exhibiting characteristics of a natural disaster, for a period no longer than
30 days. It can be extended only if the Sejm consents.The “Act on a state of natural
disaster” provides that the state of natural disaster may be introduced if massive
infections occur – as is the case in the current coronavirus crisis. The Constitution
also requires that only a published regulation, issued upon the basis of an Act, can
introduce extraordinary measures, such as the state of natural disaster. This Act also
has to specify to what extent it plans to limit fundamental rights, as prescribed in the
Constitution. During states of natural disasters, the Constitution allows for limitations
of the freedom of economic activity, personal freedom, the inviolability of the home,
the freedom of movement and sojourn on the territory of Poland, the right to strike,
the right to ownership, the freedom to work, the right to safe and hygienic conditions
of work, and the right to rest. The measures applied in this emergency, however,
limited the freedom of assembly as well – which is constitutionally impossible, even
if a state of natural disaster applies. While such a limitation may both necessary and
proportionate in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is illegitimate, as the Act on
infectious diseases does not allow for such a restriction.
Politically, the problem lies elsewhere. The Constitution foresees special provisions
for the duration of an extraordinary measure and a period of 90 days after it ends:
the term of office of the Sejm may not be shortened, and nationwide referenda,
elections to the Sejm, to the Senate, organs of local government or elections for the
Presidency may not be held. Accordingly, the term of office of these organs would be
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prolonged. In Poland, the presidential election campaign is ongoing, with the election
scheduled for 10 May 2020. The epidemic seems to work in favour of President
Andrzej Duda, who can still move around in his capacity as President, while other
candidates are more restricted. Therefore, introducing the state of natural disaster is
politically unlikely at the moment.
Furthermore, according to the Constitution, an Act specifies how to compensate for
the loss of property resulting from the fundamental right limitations in the context
of, for instance, the state of natural disaster. The relevant Act provides for proper
compensations, especially for entrepreneurs, and would be activated together with
a state of natural disaster. However, the economic loss seems to be unbearable for
Polish authorities, who have allocated most of the public money to social programs.
We expect the ruling majority to compulsively pass legislation that pretends to
provide economic help for workers and entrepreneurs.
Finally, during a state of natural disaster, the constitution requires strict cooperation
among local and central government and other public bodies. The current
government, however, seems to be unwilling to share the power and cooperate with
local governments that are led by the opposition.
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